Russian peasant soldiers, and not Petrograd’s workers influenced an outcome of the February Revolution of 1917.

Specifically:

Whenever I hear official versions of the events that led to the February Revolution of 1917, they tend to say how the proletarian forces joined by peasant soldiers took down Russian monarchy. While an overall process might have looked somewhat similar, an analysis of available social and statistical data conducted by Tony Ashworth  suggests a different scenario.

There were around 390,000 workers in Petrograd and 330,000 soldiers stationed in the Petrograd military district on the eve of February Revolution of 1917. So if we trust available historical data, about 20% of Petrograd’s workers were organized on the first day, 41% on the second and 54% on the third day. In other words, there were roughly 78,000 workers actively participating in various events. At the same time, almost 95% of soldiers from the Petrograd Military District were active or passive mutineers in about 24 hours since the first events took place. We are talking about 313,500 riflemen here.

Sure, majority of soldiers represented passive mutineers, however, they restrained from using the force against fellow riflemen who experienced the horrors of trench warfare. So we have 60,000 active mutineers who realize that 250,000 rifles will not fire on them from behind. There is no loyal military force to suppress mutineers when their numbers are really small in the early hours of the first day. The momentum is gaining traction – next stop is the October Revolution of 1917.

Any other ideas?

RFE/RL: In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” Do you agree with such an interpretation of our recent history?

Mikhail Gorbachev:
I have said this on many occasions, and I will say it again: I agree. When, during a period of widespread reform, glasnost came along and lit up the darker corners of the situation in our country, it seemed as though all of society started moving and talking. It turned out that the people had something to say and that they had someone to speak to. At this time I had already been saying that the way of democracy, glasnost, and economic reform was the way to go.

Yet I also warned against the destructive nature of what was happening. Things certainly needed to change, but we did not need to destroy that which had been built by previous generations. We had to deprive ourselves of some things, yes, but this was the unfortunate cost. After the putsch, when the real danger of the country coming apart arose, I continued to speak out in the same vein. I emphasized that the dissolution of a country that was not only powerful, but that, during perestroika, demonstrated that it was peaceful and that it accepted the basic principles of democracy, would be a tragedy. The end of the Cold War presented us with an unprecedented opportunity to pursue a new, peaceful policy.

RFE/RL: Some observers think that the State Committee for the Emergency Situation (GKChP) was the natural result of events then going on in the country, an effort to restrain the destructive processes that had arisen as a result of a systemic crisis of state management that, in turn, was created by ill-considered and sporadic reforms. Many of the participants of the so-called GKChP insist that this was the case. In you opinion, how fair is this point of view?

Gorbachev: It is nonsense. The natural result of events was the well-tuned process that was already under way in the spring of 1991. There was already the crisis that arose when people had to wait in long lines to purchase basic everyday goods. But in the big picture, after a long period of deliberation and debate, the anti-crisis program had finally started to materialize. Interestingly, it started out as a program initiated by the cabinet ministers, but then it was joined by all the republics and even the Baltic states, with their own special views on certain questions. The Baltic states didn’t actually sign the document, but they decided to implement it anyway. By this time, we had found new solutions and ways of dealing with the situation, and we were ready to move forward.

This was natural for the democratization of the Soviet Union, and it was also natural for correcting the mistakes we had made earlier, particularly our delay in reforming the Communist Party and the federated union. The goal of the putsch was to interrupt this process. The putschists were at the top of the reactionary nomenklatura — remember, many in the nomenklatura went ahead and worked with us, struggled with us. So this is my response to the common cliche that you were referring to. These people were unable to publicly overthrow the government, so they took a clandestine route, which they failed in, because difficult as the times were, nobody wanted to return to Stalinism.

RFE/RL: According to many public opinion polls, perestroika remains more popular abroad — particularly in Europe and the United States — than in the overwhelming majority of countries of the former Soviet Union. How would you, as the author of that initiative, explain such a difference in its reputation?

Gorbachev: The difference between the reputation perestroika has in Russia and abroad is explainable. Central and Eastern Europe gained independence. All of Europe got rid of the nightmare of potential confrontation — moreover, a confrontation that could have developed into nuclear war in which Europe would suffer the most damage.

Your question mentioned the CIS countries. Without going into detail, I can tell you that neither the majority of their people nor their political elite desire a return to the way things were, or have any regrets about exiting the union. Recent polls have shown that the percentage of the population in these countries in favor of a return to the Soviet Union is only about 5-7 percent.

Russia is a special case. The reason I say this is because Russia lost the most as a result of the break-up, in terms of geopolitical stature, in terms of historical merit, in terms of political power it had by virtue of controlling other republics, and finally in terms of economic strength, having ceased to be the center of a major economic complex with a population of nearly a quarter-billion people. [Former Russian President Boris] Yeltsin and [former acting Russian Prime Minister Yegor] Gaidar’s reforms destroyed the industrial potential of the country and reduced millions of people to poverty. Privatization was carried out in such a way that instead of contributing to a growing private sector, it only resulted in corruption and mass theft. The country was in shock, so people naturally looked back to the Soviet Union and the social guarantees that it offered. The guarantees were modest, but at least they were guarantees. Now, even though things are improving under Putin, I would still estimate that about 50 percent of our people live in poverty.

RFE/RL: In Russia, it is popular to argue — and you hear this at the highest political levels — that the end of the Cold War destabilized the modern world order; the solid bipolar international system was replaced by an unstable monopolar domination. Do you agree with this view?

Gorbachev: I’ve heard this view before — that the Cold War supposedly offered a level of stability. I’m not sure where this view comes from — whether it is part of someone’s agenda or simply rooted in ignorance of the situation that developed in the mid-1980s. I was touring the country at the time and from all sides I heard the same question: “Will there be war? Please, do anything you can to not let it happen. Do anything, we’ll live through whatever it takes, but just don’t let it happen.” Of course, many people forgot about this when the fear of war subsided.

The stability of the Cold War was a false one. It was tricky and dangerous. We in the Russian and U.S. governments knew better than anybody what the true situation was and what it could develop into, because we knew what point we were at in the arms race. We knew that the kind of technology that we were operating was powerful enough to put the fate of civilization in question should there be some sort of slip-up. We also knew that the arms race was leading to an unprecedented depletion of national resources.

RFE/RL: How do you assess the state of democracy and freedom of speech in Russia today?

Gorbachev: There are frequent accusations that democracy is being suppressed and that freedom of press is being stifled. The truth is, most Russians disagree with this viewpoint. We find ourselves at a difficult historical juncture. Our transition to democracy has not been a smooth one, and we must assess our successes and failures not in the context of some ideal, but in the context of our history. When Putin first came to power, I think his first priority was keeping the country from falling apart, and this required certain measures that wouldn’t exactly be referred to as textbook democracy.

Yes, there are certain worrying tendencies. We still have certain stipulations and restrictions that cannot be explained by real dangers, or by the realities of life in Russia. However, I would not dramatize the situation. In the past 20 years, Russia has changed to such an extent that going back is now impossible.

RFE/RL: Let’s turn the clock back 15 years. You suffered a horrible betrayal on the part of the people you considered your comrades-in-arms, as well as, perhaps, your personal friends. Not many people have experienced this. What personal lessons have you learned?

Gorbachev: We need to follow the path of democracy. We need to respect the people, and not turn them back into the herd that was bullied for decades and centuries in our country. We cannot resolve problems through coups. We need the people to participate in the changes that are being enacted in the country. Democracy needs to be effective. The law needs to be efficient. Thieves and corrupt officials should not feel safe. We need to follow the path of democracy toward a free, open, and prosperous country.

Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

I can’t really describe all intensity that surrounded our discussion. And maybe precisely because of it, when we were done arguing, I decided to see what opinions and scenarios exist on the Web. And here are some “What if” versions in regard to our question.

Version 1

Germany fought AGAINST the Soviet Union.

America fought FOR the Soviet Union.

Yet most people here seem to think that IF the USA had kept out of the war, then the Soviet Union would have conquered even MORE TERRITORY than it did WITH US aid?

The USSR had manpower and a huge armory. They did NOT have enough trucks, medicine or even BOOTS until the USA sent them MASSIVE quantities.

Without US aid, the UK would have LOST the U-Boat war. (American naval might and esp. naval AIR POWER defeated U-boats.) The UK would have starved and been forced to make peace; ironically, Hitler NEVER wanted to destroy the British Empire. He hoped for it as a natural ally!)

Without the two front wars, time would have turned IN FAVOR of Germany. No western front means holding out longer in the east. That means the new u-boats and jets (ALREADY EXISTING in spring 1945) could have been produced in sufficient quantity to turn the tide in the east.

Version 2

A lot of this depends on if Japan attacked the US in the Pacific, if not then I doubt there would have any war in the Pacific other than Japan trying to expand ‘slightly’ into Asia.

Eagle and Bob, I suspect you are missing the point that the Russians effectively won the European WW2, it doesn’t actually matter what you think about boots and ambulances, the Russian steamroller relies on millions of Russian men, their logistic support is to throw them some potatoes, they broke the back of the Germans on the eastern front before the US joined the war, yes the aid that was supplied was good, but try reading ‘Stalingrad’ the US supplies were nothing more than a novelty to most of the Soviets.

The Nazi’s were also hamstrung because much of their air force was wiped out in the Battle of Britain, the idea that Britain would have been taken by the Germans is wrong, the Germans gave up in 1940, and committed themselves to the east in late 1940. The British had air superiority over the Channel, and the Germans had no amphibious capability.

The question of sea power and U-boats is an interesting one, the US contribution was vital, but even if it hadn’t been there the Brits and Canadians were already developing Radar based air escort systems by the time the US really got into it, but yes it would have had a draining effect on the UK.

However the Russians would have carried on to the Atlantic, maybe by 1946, but they would have got there. The British Empire would fight back in Africa (as it did) and maybe a vast army would be raised in India, but it wouldn’t have anywhere to go. The danger is that the Soviets own continental Europe and Northern Asia, Maybe they would turn their sights on the UK and another war breaks out, the UK would soon lose to a mighty Russia….

Maybe Russia turns its sights to the Middle East or Asia.

But would the US have developed nukes if there was no war…unlikely, the Brits might have got there first, maybe the Russians would have got it? They made a big point of capturing nuclear labs in Germany.

Undoubtedly the Germans would have been defeated, the US, more than anything though, contributed to pinning back the communists, and providing future security for Western Europe.

Version 3

I think if the United States had not gotten involved, Russia does not necessarily steamroll Europe.

Part of the reason for the Soviet Union’s success against the Nazis was that much of Germany’s resources were also directed to the West, to prevent a second front in Europe. Without American Intervention I think the Germans and Russians would have eventually come to peace terms after millions had died…. neither being able to totally destroy the other. I think it would have also ended with some territorial gains for the Nazis.(Estonia, Lithuania ect.) (Perhaps, including Belarus since Hitler planned to group it together with Baltic States. WW)

Britain would also be forced to sign a separate peace with Germany. I don’t think Britain would have lost any territory to them in the peace treaty, but they would have to recognize Germany as master of Europe proper.

Japan would have had mastery of the Pacific, and would have eventually conquered all of China.

Version 4

Barbarossa was failed in summer 1941, because Hitler planned to destroy Red army before September 1941. First UK/USA aid was send 12 august 1941, army received it in September. According Barbaroosa it already should be destroyed! So, without allies help war in Russia would be harder, but victorious for CCCP. May be in 1947 Berlin would be taken by Red Army.
There are 4 main features that could give Russia advantages superiority:
1.Climat and supplies: as was said, Germans planned to defeat Russia before winter and was not ready to -30C chills. And it is very difficult to supply 6 million army.
2.Popular front: especially partisans. 300000 fighters participated in centralized partisan armies, 700000 participated in resistance movement in occupied lands of USSR. European resistance and industrial sabotage.
3. Resource deficit. In 1942 Germans was confronted with lack of resources. Before invasion they received it buying in USSR: Caucasus oil, Siberian gas, Ural metals.
4. Growing experience of soviet generals. Do you know that first Stalin’s order of the war was order not to shoot? He thought that this is provocation. Then, when army should prepare defense positions he ordered to attack. In 1942, after victory under Moscow, he decided that now Red Army is stronger than Germans and ordered to attack again by all farces and recapture Kharkov – result: Southern front is broken and Red Army is retreating to Stalingrad and Northern Caucasus. In the second part of war (1943-45) soviet generals didn’t make mistakes like that.

These are just some theories and I am curious what do you think about it. Indeed, what if the United States never entered the WWII?

Minsk. White Russia. August 17 (Delayed.)—After many months of terrorization under Bolshevist rule Minsk is beginning to resume normal life again. Groups are conversing on street corners and in doorways of houses breathing the atmosphere of relief and in every section of the population whether Jewish or Polish shopkeeper or Russian peasants and workmen one finds the same deep inexpressible thankfulness at deliverance from a government which, while pretending to give freedom and equal rights to all, actually exercised a tyranny far greater than anything known under the czars.

Personal liberties were destroyed
It must be admitted that in outward appearances the town and its population do not make a bad impression. Food certainly exists, though the operation of the Bolshevist system or rather its breakdown has resulted in perfectly impossible prices. But these facts admitted, there is nothing else to be said in favor of a regime that destroyed all personal liberty and made the humblest person feel that neither life nor property were either safe.
“To the dogs, death.” These words spoken by a woman as she kicked the dead body of a secretary of the soviet, as it still lay in the streets where he had been shot by Polish soldiers, express the bitter hatred of the people for Bolshevism. The Jewess who was president of the local “extraordinary tribunal for combating the counter revolution” and who signed the death warrants of the miserable persons who were executed almost daily was literally torn to pieces by the mob as she was being taken through the streets. A single word of criticism of the government was sufficient cause for arrest as a counterrevolutionary. When once the victim was arrested, his fate was unknown. Number of such persons is being released from Minsk prison. Over three hundred were deported to Bobrisk and Smolensk: certainly hundreds perished….

Peasants are rich

…Manufacturing and Industry have broken down, mainly, I believe, from a lack of transport: coal and other raw materials are unobtainable. There is plenty of forest land round Minsk, yet the price of wood was twelve thousand rubles. Other current prices are pound bread, 38 rubles; meat, 75 rubles; butter, 200 rubles.
…There has been one issue of bread on bread cards to the citizens since last Easter. On that occasion they received half a pound per head. Citizens of the third and fourth categories received none.
…Yet people have been coming here from Petrograd and Moscow in the hope of finding food for Minsk, which is regarded as the land of plenty.
…People were also drawn to Minsk by the hopes of its delivery by the Poles.

Propaganda
…Propaganda was the strong point with the Bolshevists. The town was placarded with posters, representing the destruction of capital by labor. Bolshevists soldiers shown threatening with a bayonet a fat gentleman in a waistcoat cowering behind cases of war munitions; in another the Russian people are shown floating to safety through a raging sea on a book labeled Karl Marx. Lectures were given daily in the square on the iniquities of capitalism; a special information bureau provided a prolific supply of news about revolutionary strikes in England, the downfall of Kolchak’s army and pogroms by the poles in Vilna.

In preparing for evacuation the soviet published a proclamation declaring that they would meet the white terror- that is, the advance of the Polish army, the red terror. In fulfillment of the threat the mass executions referred to above took place, and on leaving they carried off a large number of hostages, many of whom were women whose husbands and sons are fighting in the Polish army…

“So, who was Mickiewicz?? Polish, Lithuanian, or Belarussian?”. Because he was born in Belarus, wrote poems in Polish, and his most famous poem begins with: “Lithuania, my homeland!”.

And indeed, so much confusion and it does not stop there. Historians are still engaged in an intense discourse whether Belarusians have Baltic or Slavic roots. N.Vakar mentions in his book, “Belorussia: The Making of a Nation”:

“The Belorussians consider themselves the oldest and purest branch of the Slav family, tracing their origins to three ancient Slavic tribes: The Krivichi, Dregovichi and Radimichi…The question remains who these people were. Racial distinctions for that period are not clear. Herodotus refers to the Budini, a people dwelling in northern Scythia “in forests where there are large lakes”…

But what if there were some different civilizations on the territory of Belarus? Who could they be? In relation to these questions I stumbled across quiet unexpected article—“Remarkable discovery in Russia” published in “Gleason’s pictorial drawings – Room Companion” on September 24, 1853.

M.B. Larsky, the engineer, lately deceased, made a discovery of the greatest importance in White Russia—a discovery brought to light when his papers were examined after his decease. Being occupied in making a road in that province, he found it necessary to drain off the waters of a lake into another at a lower level, and in the course of the operation he discovered in a forest, several feet below the surface of the soil, a road paved in antique Roman or Mexican style, with traces of a stone bridge of peculiar construction. In Mr. Larsky’s opinion, 2000 or 3000 years must have elapsed before the face of the country has been transformed to such an extent as he observed, and if this supposition be well founded, the district must have been inhabited before the time of the Seythians (Scythians) by a more civilized nation. M. larsky’s discovery will doubtless not pass unnoticed, and may lead to important results.

Unfortunately, there aren’t any specific places mentioned but I don’t have any doubts that the place of discovery was somewhere in modern day Belarus. If someone has more information regarding it, please feel free to comment. It might be indeed “Remarkable discovery”…

Not long ago, one Pole argued with me that Belarusians are…Poles. Another gentleman insisted that Belarusians are somewhat like Russians who speak funny dialect and so on and forth. Various reasons and facts were presented to support theories based on their modern-day perspectives.
It is fine, but what about opinions that existed in the past on this issue? Attempting to find the answer I stumbled upon two pieces written in 1918 and 1914.

On January 18, 1918, The New York Times published an article “Lithuania Declares its Independence. Not Only Russian Territory but Part of Prussia Including Koenigsberg Claimed for New State in Eastern Europe”. The article informs readers that Lithuania declared its Independence and presents historical information about the country. And while the main topic might not necessarily evolve around the issue of White Russia and its national background, I found some interesting moments that concern my topic.

In one instance, the newspaper mentions:

“From the tenth to the sixteenth century the Lithuanian principality extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In that territory were White Russians and Ukrainians or Little Russians. White Russians are mostly of Lithuanian stock, Russianized in earlier centuries. Whoever goes from Lithuania to White Russia soon notices that the same types, customs and festivities exist there. The language of White Russia is 25 per cent, Lithuanian, and the attitude of the people toward the Lithuanians is very friendly.”

(Dark shaded areas represent territory desired by Lithuanians for their new State. Note that it includes present day Belarusian town Grodno)

More developed thoughts on this subject can be found in an article that appeared in “Folklore” on March 31, 1914. The article is titled “White Ruthenian Folk Songs” and it split into two parts: “Notes on the people”(that is White Ruthenians) and analysis of local folk.

It starts out with passage:

“White Ruthenia covers approximately the south and east of Lithuania, which was originally inhabited by peoples of the Sarmatian stock, who were divided into two branches, Lithuanian and Slavonian. The former included the Lithuanian proper, Letts, Old Prussian, and Yarzwings (now extinct); the latter the Bohemians, Ukrainians, Poles, White Ruthenians, and many others.”

And while the passage is pretty typical “historic-like” introduction the following sentence adds a bit of “character”.

“The White Ruthenians of the present day contain, no doubt, some polish and Lithuanian blood, as well as blood from other surrounding races…. The White Ruthenians occupy the present governments of Vitepsk, West Polock, Minsk, Mohylev, Grodno, and Vilno….where they are energetically carrying out a nationalist revival, in order to differentiate themselves from Poles and Lithuanians on the one hand, and from Russians on the other, — a policy which no doubt the Russian government has encouraged.”

And in an original copy, the first sentence contains a reference on the bottom of the page:

“Sometimes called Byelorusses or White Russians, but incorrectly, since no White Ruthenian would ever alow himself to be called by a name which would imply that he was Russian.”

The authors (H. Iwanowska and H.Onslow) continue by saying about the White Ruthenian language:

“The language is Slavonic and totally unlike Lithuanian, (which is more closely allied to Sanskrit than any other European language), and, though unlike Polish, resembles it more than it does Russian.”

Why would he do so? Well, because “…he had been advised by real estate experts that on a practicable, long-term basis it would be better to have leases drawn ‘directly between the insurance companies and the individual tenants,’ that is, the United Nations employes themselves.”
But still, the question stays the same, even more, there comes one more: Why would UN employees deal directly with landlords? Maybe, it happened because: “Constantin Stavropoulos, head of the United Nations employes’ staff committee, had formally asked United Nations officials for clarification of what he said might be interpreted as ‘discriminatory clauses’ contained in the agreements”.

Very interesting…But “discriminatory clauses” are not that specific, therefore, it needs some more details. And there they come: “…agreements with the Metropolitan and New York Life contained ‘a customary clause’ under which the landlord reserved the right to reject tenants who were not found ‘suitable’, the ‘secretariat does not assume that this clause implies racial discrimination”.
And perhaps, precisely because of it, “The United Nations and the two insurance companies are now discussing new agreements under which the United Nations will select the most eligible of its employes on the basis of the present point system. The insurance companies would then choose from among those applicants” (1947)

Now, a whole picture becomes a little bit clearer. Obviously, the United Nations employes are from many different countries and races and while nobody assumes that there is a “racial suitability” implied in a lease agreement, it is still wise to hook up potential tenants with landlords directly and thus avoid all possible and “awkward” problems. It is like give them a clue and let them decide whether they want it or not. And that is just a beginning of a story.

The few months later, the Citizens Housing Council of New York Inc., hailed the United Nations for canceling rental agreement. “This action is significant not only because it implements U.N. policy. It also adds emphasis to appeals recently made to Metropolitan in connection with its announced intention to bar Negroes from Stuyvesant Town which is receiving public aid by way of partial tax exemption, and other advantages.”(1947, Jun.6)
In the same line of thinking, Shad Polier, vice president of the American Jewish Congress, urged the City to apologize to the United Nations for the “serious disservice which has been rendered to personnel and its principles by two insurance companies”.(1947, Jun.6)

And even though, officially U.N. had nothing to do with the Insurance companies, its unofficial policy of “let our employees figure it out themselves” caused a wave of protests among people working for the U.N. On July 17, 1947, they (200 stuff members) signed a petition, vigorously protesting a revised or informal agreement arguing that it actually invites United Nations employees to support discriminatory practices. The submitted petition charged that “…staff members of the United Nations are being invited to conclude leases with these companies on an individual basis when it is clear that by doing so they would acquiesce in the racial discrimination practiced by these companies against their colleagues.” (July 17, 1947),/p>

At the time, the insurance companies defended their policies by arguing that “…Emphasizing that he was taking the ‘human angle’ Mr. Eyriey ( from a department of public information) said that it was important to bear in mind that racial discrimination as practiced in this country by landlords was mainly for financial reasons. It was a well-known fact, he continued, that Negro tenants lowered the value of property considerably. In defiance to cries of ‘shame’ coming from some of his colleagues Mr. Eyriey insisted that the practical side must not be ignored.” (July 18, 1947)

On July 24, 1947, more than thousand of U.N. employees demanded a cancellation of any type agreement between U.N. and insurance companies. Paul Eisler of Czechoslovakia, an employee in the Economic Affairs section argued that records of the New York Supreme Court indicated that the Metropolitan insurance company would bar his ‘colored colleagues’ from an apartment at Peter Cooper Village, in violation of charter principles calling for equality of all races.”(July 25, 1947) Shad Polier went farther by saying: “Americans have long been aware that ‘private governments’ like Metropolitan Life are sometimes more powerful than are public governments and our Constitution. But the world will learn with amazement that such American private governments can also be more powerful than all the governments organized in the United Nations.” (1947, July 26)

But hear this one, on November 27 1948: “Confirming last month’s estimate that 62 percent of tenants of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village favor admittance to the housing project of qualified Negros, a tenant vote showed 240 for admittance and 126 against….”(1948)
However, on December 3, 1948 “The Appellate Division reserved decision yesterday on two appeals from a decision of Supreme Court Justice Felix C.Benvenga who dismissed actions brought against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and its subsidiary, Stuyvesant Town, East Side housing project, for alleged discrimination in selecting tenants. …The arguments were ended yesterday when Assistant Corporation Counsel William Lebwold asserted that the City had no ‘right or power to interfere with the management’ of the housing development. “(Dec 3, 1948)

Reference

Investments Net Insurance Profit. (1947, Feb 15), The New York Times, p.21
George Barrett (1947, Apr.22), U.N. Seeks revision of housing leases. The New York Times, p.22
Groups acclaim U.N. for voiding rentals (1947, June 6), The New York Times, p.5
U.N. mass protest on housing today. (1947, July 17, 1947), The New York Times, p.3
U.N. staff pushes rental curb fight. (1947, July 18, 1947), The New York Times, P.5
U.N. employes ask end of rent pacts. (1947, July 25), The New York Times, p.19
The UNO capitulates (1947, July 26) The Chicago Defender, p. 14
N.Y. Tenants Again Vote No Race Bar (1948, Nov27) The Chicago Defender, P.2
Decision is reserved in housing bias suit (1948, Dec 3) The New York Times, P.17

That was his report, and it signaled the end of terror and re-orientation of the Soviet Union’s course. In the West, many considered Khruchev’s words as an act of bravery and beginning of new and more liberal approach. However, there are some reports in Russia, that Khruchev’s speech was rather an attempt to cover up his own wrongdoings.

Yuri Zhukov, a historian with the Russian Science Academy, thinks that Khruchev blamed everything on Stalin because he was soaked in blood of innocent people himself. Zhukov’s theory is based on recently declassified Soviet archives.
In the Politburo archives, Zhukov found a telegram send by Khruchev, who after becoming a Leader of Ukraine in 1938, asked Politburo to authorize execution or arrest of more than 33 thousand people. Soon after that, there was a massive “clean up” of the “undesirable” elements. A year earlier, when Khruchev was a head of the Moscow district, he asked an authorization to execute 8.5 thousand “traitors” and to sent almost 33 thousand to the concentration camps. “Those persecutions where real and had been done because Khruchev authorized them”, says Zhukov. Overall, according to the documents found in the Politburo archives, Khruchev was seeking the authorization to execute or arrest about 70 thousand people in the 1930’s.

Young Russian intellectual Dima Bykov says that Khruchev was an assiduous Stalin’s server. “When I was a teacher, talking about Khruchev’s speech I used the following analogy, “Imagine Gimmler, making antifascist speech on a meeting of the Nazis after the Hitler’s death.”

And though there is a huge debate going on regarding Khruchev’s role in this whole thing, Nikita Khruchev, his grandson, thinks that: “while there are many controversial documents existing regarding his grandfather, the fact that he had guts to expose Stalin, was his personal act of bravery. It meant that he defeated Stalin inside of him.”

At the same time, Bykov calls Khruchev a brave person who admitted that he made mistakes and tried to conduct reforms but did not have enough will to completely destroy the whole system.

Written using materials from Inopressa.ru

That day, President Harry S. Truman fired Mr. Henry Wallace; a Secretary of Commerce who criticized Truman’s foreign policy toward the USSR. The Washington Post wrote that this move had to be done so that H. Wallace’s views would not longer “‘jeopardize’ America’s foreign relations.” During his statement, President Truman specified that while “Americans might disagree freely and publicly on any question” at the same time “the government of the United States of America had to stand as a unit in its relations with the rest of the world”. (Edward T. Folliard, 1946)

Here, President Truman was referring to Mr. Wallace’s speech given in Madison Square Garden in which he advocated position where the USA would cooperate with the USSR, something that was far away from official lines. In his speech, Mr.Wallace went over British “imperial policy in the Middle East” at the time when the US Navy was cooperating together with British Navy in the Middle East. And, exactly at the same time, Soviet newspaper, Izvesia, bashed Britain for violating sovereignty of some states and creating war-like atmosphere in the World. Obviously, such speech would hardly benefit or improve US-British diplomatic relations. The New York Times cited an article that appeared in French newspaper The Monde: “His (Wallace’s) gibe at England is surprising in view of Anglo-American cooperation in diplomacy, with Mr. Byrnes(Secretary of

State) rather than Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin leading the anti-Soviet front”

.(Harold Callender, 1946)

Interestingly, according to The Los Angeles Times, President Truman who approved the Wallace’s speech later said he found it “no departure from foreign policy under Secretary Byrnes”.(AP, 1946) And yet, during the press-conference, he used words that describe Wallace as someone who departed from official line of thinking thus jeopardizing “unity of the government.” Perhaps, in an attempt to slightly cover such awkward situation, the LA Times mentions that the State Department did not clear the speech text even though it was delivered by a Cabinet member with the explicit approval from the President. They also mention that the State Department officials indicated that “in actual delivery, Wallace dropped whole sentences from his prepared text, including language admonishing Russia to ‘stop conniving against us’ and stop teaching that communism ‘by force, if necessary’ must triumph ultimately over democratic capitalism”.

Is not it confusing? First, the speech is approved, then criticized and after all, it is hinted that it was not an actual speech presented to the President. I think it is for reason that a game of politics is the tricky one. Go figure if it was an actual speech or not, did Wallace improvised while delivering it or not, or maybe Truman wanted to get rid of the “last New Dealer?” In one instance, The Washington Post said that ousting of Wallace caused “a squall of speculations in Washington. Had Byrnes told Mr. Truman that ‘Henry goes or I go?’ What would be the effect on the 1946 campaign? Would the Democrats lose the support of liberals and left-wingers who have regarded Wallace as their champion?”(1946). And while the White House denied any type of the ultimatum by Byrnes, saying that the President reached this decision himself, the same article mentions the “indisputable fact that Mr. Truman reached his decision after talking to Byrnes”.(1946)

In a post 1945 world, many works appeared analyzing Wallace’s career and political views. Some called him a “Commie”, “Red”, “Leftie” or “Idealist”. But who was this man? An answer will depend on political views of an author but one fact should remain: Henry Wallace was one of the most humane minds of his time. “The century on which we are entering – the century which will come of this war – can be and must be the century of the common man,” he said back in 1942. He hated fascism and envisioned world where all people had self-determination and civil rights. He assigned a very important role to the UN in his envisioned world and argued that: “…in order that the United Nations may effectively serve the world, it is vital that the United States and Russia be in accord as to the fundamentals of an enduring peace.”(Alonzo L. Hamby, Apr., 1968)

These words came in 1942, at the time when the USA and USSR were allies. The few years later they would become fierce enemies but Wallace would stand by his words. He denounced Truman’s “getting tough” policy arguing that authoritarian regimes in Greece and Turkey were far from being called “democratic”. Wallace supported American-Russian accord and believed that “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” approach would alienate and destroy unity between two superpowers. He followed a line “the tougher we get, the tougher the Russian will get” and supported sphere of influences that would divide the world but at the same time keep it in a peaceful mode. Wallace’s followers argued later that his policies helped to keep peace and some documents might prove it. For example, CIA’s classified document dated on Aug., 27, 1948 says that: “The assumption of a possible future war with the West is implicit in Soviet propaganda since September 1946, the month of …speech and resignation of Wallace from the Cabinet” (CIA, 1946) Could it be a coincidence or maybe Wallace’s actions, while a member of the Cabinet, indeed kept the USSR from openly denouncing the US policies?

It could be either way, however, in opinion of many, he still was a way too sentimental, idealistic and perhaps naïve to believe “Uncle Joe” and his totalitarian ideology. While many liberals realized that communists had world-wide aspirations, he continued to advocate spheres of influences believing that the USSR will stop there. And yet he failed to follow his logic, and thought of the Marshall Plan as something almost fascist.”(Alonzo L. Hamby, Apr., 1968) He was not consistent as an idealist or realist. At the time when many liberals preferred a policy of affirmative containment, Wallace did not accept it. In words of Alfonso N. Hamby:

“He (Wallace) had been unable to discard the assumptions of the war years and still thought in terms of the Popular Front, of anti-fascism struggling against fascism, though such views took him farther from the reality of world politics. A man of the most humane instincts and of elements of greatness, he had destroyed his career by his intellectual rigidity.”

Reference:

Folliard, Edward (1946, Sep.21) President Says Views “Jeopardized” U.S. Relations. The Washington Post, p.1.
Los Angeles Times (1946, Sep. 14) Wallace’s Speech Causes Wide Furor. The Los Angeles Times, Pg.2.
Alfonso L. Hamby (Apr., 1968) Henry A. Wallace, the Liberals and Soviet-American Relations. The Review of Politics, Vol.30, No.2.
Harold Callender (1946, Sep.14) Byrnes Deeply Disturbed by Wallace’s Policy Talk; Truman Under Fire For It. The New York Times, Pg.1
CIA, (1948, Aug., 1948) Evidence of USSR Military Intentions in Soviet Propaganda Broadcast. Copy #71