Russian peasant soldiers, and not Petrograd’s workers influenced an outcome of the February Revolution of 1917.

Specifically:

Whenever I hear official versions of the events that led to the February Revolution of 1917, they tend to say how the proletarian forces joined by peasant soldiers took down Russian monarchy. While an overall process might have looked somewhat similar, an analysis of available social and statistical data conducted by Tony Ashworth  suggests a different scenario.

There were around 390,000 workers in Petrograd and 330,000 soldiers stationed in the Petrograd military district on the eve of February Revolution of 1917. So if we trust available historical data, about 20% of Petrograd’s workers were organized on the first day, 41% on the second and 54% on the third day. In other words, there were roughly 78,000 workers actively participating in various events. At the same time, almost 95% of soldiers from the Petrograd Military District were active or passive mutineers in about 24 hours since the first events took place. We are talking about 313,500 riflemen here.

Sure, majority of soldiers represented passive mutineers, however, they restrained from using the force against fellow riflemen who experienced the horrors of trench warfare. So we have 60,000 active mutineers who realize that 250,000 rifles will not fire on them from behind. There is no loyal military force to suppress mutineers when their numbers are really small in the early hours of the first day. The momentum is gaining traction - next stop is the October Revolution of 1917.

Any other ideas?

According to the diplomat, Washington is continuing to consider the situation about the American diplomats in Belarus.

The Associated Press reported 1 May the US Department of State had ordered Belarus to close its embassy in Washington and consulate in New York. According to the Associated Press, the Department of State may close its embassy in Minsk as early as Friday, 2 May.

But the same day Radio Svaboda, referring to the Associated Press, reported that the US had abruptly backed down on its decision to close American embassy in Minsk. Instead of it, Tom Casey, the Department of State’s official, said the Belarusian diplomats had been warned against possible steps.

“There certainly are a number of steps, and we have told them that we are considering the full range of options in terms of our respective diplomatic presences,” Casey said.

However, the Department of State’s official didn’t say what measures can be taken against the Belarusian authorities.

The Belarus-US relations have tightened after the US Treasury Department published on its site clarification of the sanctions, imposed against Belneftekhim company in November 2007. Belarusian ambassador to the US Mikhail Khvastou was recalled from Washington for consultations on 7 March. US ambassador Karen Stewart left Minsk on 12 March on the insistence of the Belarusian side. The US was recommended to reduce its embassy staff. On 27 March 17 US diplomats left Minsk.

On 31 March Belarus decided to reduce its embassy staff in Washington and suggested the US to do the same. On 23 April the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered that till 30 April the US embassy should give a list of 5 American diplomats who will remain to work in Belarus.

On 30 April US Charge d’Affaires Jonathan Moore was handed a list of American diplomats who are considered persona non grata in Belarus and should leave the county within 72 hours.

The US Department of State’s spokesman Sean McCormack said on a briefing, commenting on this decision by the official Minsk, the United States would reduce its embassy staff as the Belarusian side insisted, though they found this decision to be “unjustified and unwarranted.”

According to him, the US is not going to reject its principles: “We want to have a good relationship with Belarus and work to try to improve that. But we are not going to do that and sacrifice principles of pushing for freedom of expression, political freedoms and other freedoms in Belarus.” “We are considering our response to this action,” S. McCormack declared.

P.S.And from my personal observations, it seems that Belarusian consulate in New York already wraped up most of its operations and services provided to Belarusian citizens in the USA.

To underscore all seriousness of these dialogues just look at the names of the firms that took part in them: Cardinal Resources, AES, Northland Power, Holtec, Hunt Oil, Aspect Energy, Vanco, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Shell, Westinghouse, Hitachi America, Safeguards Inc., Allied Technologies Group, Halliburton, PFC Energy, Devon, Marathon Oil, Trident Oil.

I happened to know some people who were directly involved with the third forum and learned of a very interesting speech given by Senator Luger. So if you interested in the Energy sector and geopolitics revolving around it, a transcript of his speech might be a good informational source. Additional info might be found on usukrainianrelations.org website or Senator Luger’s web page at www.lugar.senate.gov

US-Ukraine Energy Dialogue III
Securing Ukraine’s Energy Independence
The Need for a Trans-Atlantic Energy Security Strategy
Senator Richard Lugar

Presentation by Senator Richard G. Lugar, delivered at “US-Ukraine Energy Dialogue III”, Capitol Hill/Hart SOB Ninth Floor Forum Room, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2008.

I welcome this opportunity to participate in the U.S.-Ukraine Energy Dialogue Series. Increasingly, access to energy is at the heart of security concerns for both the United States and Ukraine, as it is for other European countries. This concern is manifested in sometimes desperate efforts to attain reliable energy supplies, and it looms across our multilateral relationships. Energy is so essential to maintaining a high quality of life that guaranteeing reliable energy supplies is sometimes conceived as an almost existential concern for countries. Likewise, the definition of our trans-Atlantic community and capacity for multilateral action is threatened if we are unable to act upon this most important of challenges.

In my view, the trans-Atlantic community now stands at a critical decision point that demands a collective energy security strategy. The most urgent challenge such a strategy must address is how to forge a more productive relationship with Russia as that country accelerates its drive to increase its influence over natural gas supplies to Europe. The current European strategy will be unsuccessful in meeting this challenge. Success at developing productive European and Russian energy interdependence requires much more European unity.

The absence of a collective energy security strategy will lead to greater fragmentation among European nations and across the Atlantic. This fragmentation will not be exclusive to energy policy; it may also detrimentally impact our ability to act upon shared security and economic issues. This concern was illustrated at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania. Members struggled to find agreement on final language affirming the future membership of Ukraine and Georgia. It was disappointing that Membership Action Plans were not awarded. Numerous reasons were cited for withholding the Membership Action Plans, including a lack of public support for NATO membership in Ukraine and frozen conflicts with Russian-backed separatists in Georgia. Yet Russia’s adamant opposition was the elephant in the room. Many alliance members are heavily dependent on Russia for energy, and they are well aware of Russia’s record of using energy to exert pressure o n neighboring countries.

Some countries enjoy long-term energy contracts with Russia and Gazprom, and are pursuing pipeline systems dedicated almost exclusively to meeting their own needs. Others are former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states located in what the Kremlin calls its “sphere of influence,” and may face Russian demands for foreign policy or economic policy concessions backed up by concerns of energy cutoffs.

Two years ago at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, I encouraged the Alliance to make energy security an Article V commitment in which a member experiencing a deliberate energy disruption would receive assistance from other alliance members. I argued that a natural gas shutdown experienced by a European country in the middle of winter could cause death and economic loss on the scale of a military attack. Such circumstances are made more dangerous by the prospects that nations might become desperate, increasing the chances of armed conflict and terrorism.

Many European friends felt I raised some valid points but that this was not a subject they were inclined to discuss in public. Others argued that energy issues should be handled by the European Union, not NATO. I am less interested in which organization leads the effort, than in ensuring that someone leads the discussion. Neither NATO nor the EU has developed an adequate strategy to address Europe’s energy vulnerability.

In the two years since the Riga summit, discussion of energy security has increased. However, the trend has been predominantly toward bilateral agreements as Gazprom seeks to increase its control over gas supplies, a situation that will have implications for European security for decades to come.

Bilateral deals with Germany to construct the Nord Stream pipeline and with Italy’s ENI to construct the South Stream pipeline will reduce Russia’s dependence on current transit countries while also blunting the economic position of non-Russian alternative pipelines like Nabucco. Russia has recently inked pipeline agreements with Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary. These nations had little reason for confidence that their western neighbors would support them in case of an energy emergency. We should not be surprised that they reacted by seeking their own deals with Russia. Such deals are being made from positions of weakness. European governments are being pressured to surrender majority shares of national refineries and energy transportation systems. Meanwhile, Serbia agreed to sell its energy assets to Russia around the same time that Moscow declared its opposition to Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Russia’s strategy is not limited to Eastern Europe. North Africa is a key source of natural gas for Europe, and Gazprom is seeking agreements with Libya and Algeria. An April 9, 2008, article in the International Herald Tribune underscored the consequences of this action: “Some analysts describe Gazprom’s moves in North Africa as a ‘pincer’ attack on Europe. They say if Gazprom succeeds in Libya and in Algeria, where it is already competing for contracts, it could end up dominating the supply routes to Southern Europe.” Russia has even advocated a global natural gas cartel and proposed a trans-Saharan pipeline linking West Africa to export terminals in North Africa in an effort to gain leverage over African gas supplies to Europe.

Gazprom’s monopoly-seeking behavior should not come as a surprise. We have seen in our own history that without regulation, many businesses will seek to gain monopoly power. The difficulty in restraining this tendency is multiplied when the business in question is backed by the Russian government.

Some European leaders have argued that energy is an economic issue that depends on markets and should not involve governments. Unfortunately, not all energy suppliers are playing by these rules. It is difficult to distinguish where the Russian Government ends and where Gazprom begins. Clearly Gazprom has sacrificed profits and needed domestic infrastructure investments to achieve Russian foreign policy goals. This is the crux of the problem facing the trans-Atlantic community.

The Kremlin and Gazprom have shut off energy supplies to six different countries during the last several years. These energy cutoffs were efforts at Russian intimidation. Unfortunately, neither NATO nor the EU provided assistance to its members. In fact, several European capitals were conspicuously silent, failing to even lodge complaints.

In this context, it is no surprise that Membership Action Plans for NATO and Georgia and Ukraine were complicated by energy security at the Bucharest Summit. Georgia has faced significant gas supply interruptions dating back to President Saakashvilli’s election victory. Ukraine has had energy supplies cut off several times. Russia made clear to European energy importers their strong opposition to Ukraine and Georgia receiving Membership Action Plans.

While several NATO and EU members have pursued a unified European energy strategy, others have frustrated the formulation of a European policy. The effect of Nord Stream and South Stream will be to increase overall European dependence on Gazprom, make certain countries like Ukraine more vulnerable to supply disruption, and make it easier to divide Europe on critical foreign policy issues.

Russia will be Europe’s preeminent energy supplier for decades, but this does not have to be a confrontational relationship. Nor do European countries have to be in a weakened bargaining position because of their import dependence. Right now, NATO and the EU have tremendous leverage in developing a more constructive relationship with Russia on energy.

Establishing a Trans-Atlantic Energy Policy
It is time for the trans-Atlantic community to establish a credible energy security strategy that diversifies energy sources for all Europe, establishes a collective framework to work with Russia, and refuses to tolerate the use of energy as an instrument of coercion. Russia, Europe, and the United States should be interdependent partners in energy security. Russia will benefit from U.S. and European investment, expertise, technology, and trade revenue, and Europe – like the U.S. – will benefit from reliable supplies and investment opportunities.

The dilemma now is that European countries are trying to solve their energy security concerns with Russia on a bilateral basis. Some countries will be more successful than others. Still others risk being left behind completely. While several European countries struggle to form a collective strategy, Russia is highly organized and strategic in pursuing its energy strategy.

I believe NATO should play a leading role in formulating and advancing a trans-Atlantic energy security strategy because energy and security are synonymous. As the world’s preeminent security alliance, it is NATO’s duty to respond to crises threatening member states as well as act to prevent such crises. Failure to address energy will undermine the alliance’s ability to act in a unified way on these core functions.

While the current situation appears grim, progress in unifying Europe behind a cohesive energy policy can be made in the near term. A first priority should be completing the so-called East-West energy corridor to bring oil and gas across the Caspian from Central Asia to distribution points from Central Europe. This will help diversify gas supplies to Europe, thus increasing its collective bargaining position. Success requires leadership in promoting Caspian sources of energy with independent transportation routes; supporting pro-Western governments in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that host significant energy transportation routes; and developing strong multilateral support and funding for the Nabucco pipeline.

Promoting Caspian Energy Sources
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan hold large energy reserves. While not as large as Russia’s, they can play a pivotal role in European diversification efforts. When I visited leaders in both governments earlier this year, they told me that they want more dialogue with the West. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan recently concluded large-scale agreements with Moscow to sell more gas and oil to Russia for delivery to European markets. In part, these deals were reactions to the failure of the West to provide alternatives and to engage leadership in the region. Both countries understand that while maintaining trade with Russia, it is in their interests to diversify their export opportunities.

The willingness of these governments to discuss trans-Caspian alternatives will not turn into investments on the ground without concerted, high-level engagement. President Putin visits the region several times a year, and his personal diplomacy has been critical to Russia’s success. I am encouraged that just last week, we saw an announcement that Turkmenistan has agreed to make natural gas available to European markets. Nevertheless, NATO and EU leaders have not devoted the time, energy, and political capital required to solidify Western relationships in the region.

I strongly urged the Administration to appoint a Special Energy Envoy to the Caspian region. The White House responded by naming C. Boyden Gray to the position. He currently leads the U.S. mission to the European Union and will be dual-hatted. Special Envoy Gray’s close relationship with President Bush gives him significant gravitas in building relationships and promoting U.S. interests in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. I wish him well and hope that he will make significant progress. Notwithstanding the contributions a Special Envoy can make, it is time for a U.S. President to visit Central Asia and make these critical geostrategic arguments in person. President Bush should consider a visit before he steps down in January, but his successor must certainly make a visit to Central Asia a high priority early in his or her presidency.

Supporting Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
Energy resources from the Caspian and independent transportation routes are dependent upon Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Recently, President Aliyev of Azerbaijan told me that he had put his country on a path of cooperation and dialogue with the West, and we have seen this sentiment borne out in a number of ways. Yet we cannot take for granted the progress made in Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Turkey. These three countries host the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines, which are carrying oil and gas from Azerbaijani fields in the Caspian toward Western markets.

To ensure true resource diversification, the trans-Atlantic community must continue to support the independence and democratic transformations in the Caucasus. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have made great progress, but need substantial and on-going international support as their governmental and economic institutions evolve. If NATO’s failure to extend Membership Action Plans at the Bucharest summit is interpreted as lack of commitment, this will not be helpful in securing Georgia’s future. An unfortunate result of that meeting could be the perception that Russian intimidation can affect the alliance’s approach to Caspian security.

European positioning on future Turkish membership in the EU also has consequences for energy security. Unfounded fears of mass migration and other cryptic concerns must be rejected. Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq has strained U.S-Turkey bilateral ties. It is time for the United States to redouble our efforts to improve the relationship and support Turkey’s EU ambitions. Turkish membership is important to regional security, outreach to the Muslim world, and energy diversification.

Supporting the Nabucco Pipeline
The Nabucco natural gas pipeline is intended to connect energy infrastructure nodes in Turkey and Austria passing through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. It is intended to be the final link connecting Caspian energy resources with European consumers, but it is being challenged by the Russian-backed South Stream pipeline proposal that would cross the Black Sea.

Numerous NATO and EU member states have attempted to make the Nabucco pipeline a reality. Unfortunately, their efforts have been stymied. Reluctant European governments must be convinced that long-term security interests are not served by developing a two-tier European energy society. European history has proven that insecurity in one country is enough to provoke reactions across the entire continent. The EU took an important first step by appointing a Commissioner for the Nabucco Pipeline, but success will depend on the level of cooperation he receives from member states.

Although diversifying energy transit routes from Central Asia to Europe should be a first priority, this does not diminish the importance of rapid progress in building energy trade with North African countries, increasing use of biofuels, improving efficiency in power and transportation, deploying clean coal and carbon sequestration technologies, and increasing usage of nuclear power. Nor does it negate the need for proactive engagement with Russia to advocate market-oriented energy policies. Yet without decisive action by the trans-Atlantic community to increase their leverage in energy dialogue with Russia, Western unity on a wide range of security issues will be put in jeopardy. In such an environment, it may become increasingly difficult to find common ground with Russia.

Conclusion
The trans-Atlantic community has the ability and responsibility to provide energy security for all of Europe, not just those countries in Moscow’s favor. We can continue to hope that the economics of energy supply and pricing will be rational and transparent; that nations with abundant energy resources will reliably supply those who need them through normal market transactions; that pipelines and other means of transmission will be safe and reliable; that energy rich nations will not exclude or confiscate productive foreign energy investments in the name of nationalism; and that vast energy wealth will not be used as a political tool or military weapon. But hope alone has not succeeded to date. The trans-Atlantic community must come to grips with the fact that our future is threatened by the continued abdication of leadership on energy. Our energy-derived vulnerabilities will continue until we have the possibility of collective action and are implementing supply diversification.

The upcoming EU summit scheduled for June in Slovenia is an opportunity for progress. President Bush has been invited, and he should spur European heads of state to be more resolute in pursuing European energy security. He is sure to receive the support of many of the newest members, but will more experienced members continue to resist a common European energy strategy? President Bush must start reaching out to his colleagues today if he is to be successful. I believe we have time to reverse the damage that has been done to our security and set ourselves on the right course for a healthy, respectful, and market-based relationship with Russia. This will be the foremost test of alliance unity in the coming decade. It is a test we must not fail.

“Alyaksandr Lukashenka is consciously set to break relations with the US, after which rupture of relations with Europe could follow, as he is preparing surrender of Belarus to Russia. And he needs scapegoats to blame for these things happening,” stated the international coordinator of the Charter’97, a member of the organising committee of the civil campaign “European Belarus” Andrei Sannikov, commenting on the intention of the Belarusian authorities to reduce staff of the Belarusian mission in Washington again.

The Second international Conference dedicated to the memory of the first Estonian president Lennart Meri took place in Tallinn under the auspices of Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves and was dedicated to problems of Europe. Prime-ministers of Estonia and Georgia, Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union Robert Cooper, European Enlargement Commissar Olli Rehn, high-ranking diplomats from Europe and the US, members of the European Parliament and national parliaments of the EU countries, leading international analysts and journalists took part in the conference.

The international coordinator of the Charter’97, a former deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Andrei Sannikov and the head of “We Remember” foundation Iryna Krasouskaya have taken part in the conference as Belarus representatives.

- The conference was important, as it took place right on the eve of the NATO summit in Bucharest. By the way, many participants of the conference flew from Tallinn to Bucharest directly. Not only issues of the NATO enlargement, but of further enlargement of the European Union were discussed at the conference, as well as issues of European international security, relations with Russia and Europe’s relations with neighbouring countries, including Belarus, — Andrei Sannikov noted in an interview to the Chater’97 press-center.

What exactly has been said about Belarus at the conference?

- Naturally, events of March 25-27 had their consequences for the international community. The topic of Belarus, as a European neighbour where beating of people during peaceful protests continues, where political prisoners exist, worries both our neighbours and the EU in general. It was said at the conference that efforts of democratic states should be concentrated on protection of human rights in Belarus, on release of political prisoners and prevention of application of force by the regime. The US representatives called upon Europeans to take appropriate steps against Lukashenka’s regime.

What other questions were discussed at the conference?

- In general, the central intrigue of this conference, like the NATO summit, is Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. This problem hasn’t been solved yet, and it won’t be solved during Bucharest summit at the level of the presidents. In any case, both Georgia and Ukraine are viewed by the EU and the US as future members of the EU and the NATO. Today differences on this issue between the US and Germany exist, however the number of supporters of including the two post-Soviet republics into the Euroatlantic space is steadily growing. In any case, disagreement between the US and Germany on the issue of the EU and NATO membership does not influence their policy towards Belarus. Full understanding of the situation and an appropriate view on how this situation should be solved exist here. As the conference was held in Estonia, it is natural that the position of the Baltic States and of the countries of Northern Europe on international issues has been discussed in detail. This group of the states is united in what concerns the further growth of both the EU and the NATO. They are adhering to the policy of open doors. By the way, representatives of these countries said that one day Belarus and Moldova would be eligible to qualify for membership in the European Union.

What is Your evaluation of the decision of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry about additional reduction of the Belarusian Embassy’s staff in Washington and the demand of the Belarusian side to cut the staff of the US Embassy in Minsk again?

- Most likely, some “smart guy” advises Lukashenka to get rid of the US presence in Belarus in order to supposedly facilitate the process of negotiations with Europe. I hope that it is not the Foreign Ministry’s initiative, as even in totalitarian states Foreign Ministries are interested in maintaining and development of relations with the democratic world. I do not think that the Foreign Ministry could recommend doing obvious foolishness, like rupture of relations with the US. Actions of the Belarusian authorities cannot be called anything but provoking the US for severance of relations. Such rupture would have an impact on ties of Belarus not only with Europe, but, strange as it may appear, with Russia and other economically attractive regions of the world. There is another, more dangerous explanation of the actions of the official Minsk. Lukashenka is consciously set to break relations with the US, after which rupture of relations with Europe could follow, as he is preparing surrender of Belarus to Russia. And he needs scapegoats to blame for these things happening.

Russian president Vladimir Putin is expected to arrive to Bucharest to the NATO summit. What could be expected from this visit?

- If this will happen, it will be the first visit of Putin to the NATO summit for the whole period of his rule. And here analysts are lost oneself in conjectures, will it be an address of Putin in Munich, where he outlined the policy of confrontation with the West, or on the contrary, he will use this visit for improving relations with the West, in order to give Medvedev a more favourable basis for development of these relations. The West is essentially ready for the hard line of Russia on all issues, including issues of energy security. Russia’s policy of the recent years has made the West to get ready for possible continuation of energy blackmailing rather seriously. As long as Europe is the main consumer of Russia’s energy resources, counter-measures that are taken today, would have adverse effect for Russia primarily. Today Russia is actively opposing Ukraine’s possible membership in the NATO, however Russian arguments are less taken into account by the West, as Russia’s reputation has been seriously undermined by its anti-democratic policy inside he country.

Radio Svaboda reports that First Polish TV channel in conjunction with Everest movie Production Company recently finished working on a documentary movie “Lessons of Belarusian Language. Youth against Lukashenka”. It was directed by Miroslav Dembinsky and it was already premiered in Riga and Vilnius. The movie tells about now closed Belarusian Humanitarian Lyceum and its students who actively participated in the “Denim Revolution” during the presidential elections that took place in Belarus last March.

Mr. Dembinsky says that while events that took place in March play a significant role in the movie another goal of filmmakers was to show Belarus in the dramatic moment from a perspective of youth. The director hopes that this movie will show how students were getting prepared for such decisive moment for their country, how they were attempting to spread the word and wake up Belarusian masses prior to the Presidential elections.

Mr. Dembinsky also said that at this moment the studio already made deals with TV companies of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Croatia to show the movie. It also plans to offer this movie to 74 largest TV channels in Europe and the United States of America. In the near future, Mr. Dembinsky is planning to make another movie about Belarusian Rock.

Academic freedom issues

The government limited academic freedom. Authorities often required department head approval for university lectures or lecture notes. Although authorities implemented the requirement inconsistently, university professors generally practiced self-censorship. Numerous university students reported that universities taught mandatory courses on “Karimov studies” devoted to books and speeches by the president and that missing any of these seminars constituted grounds for expulsion.

A 2005 ministry of higher education decree effectively prohibited any cooperation between higher educational institutions and foreign organizations without explicit prior approval by the government. During the year the government pressured teachers and students not to participate in conferences sponsored by diplomatic missions or academic exchange programs. There were reports that students chose not to participate in international exchange programs after being threatened with the loss of scholarships. Others who participated in exchange programs reported losing their jobs at educational institutions upon their return to their country. There were numerous reports that government officials pressured local nationals to prevent them from participating in cultural events sponsored by foreign diplomatic missions.

General human rights issues

Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with a population of approximately 27.3 million.Citizens did not have the right in practice to change their government through peaceful and democratic means.(No suprises there whatsoever). Security forces routinely tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees under interrogation to obtain confessions or incriminating information. In several cases authorities subjected human rights activists and other critics of the regime to forced psychiatric treatment. Human rights activists and journalists who criticized the government were subject to harassment, arbitrary arrest, politically motivated prosecution, and physical attack. The government generally did not take steps to investigate or punish the most egregious cases of abuse, although it prosecuted many officials for corruption.

Authorities sought to control all nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity and forced the de facto closure of Human Rights Watch (HRW), one of the last international human rights organizations in the country. The departure of international human rights organizations from the country negatively affected the ability of foreign embassies to report on human rights violations. The government also limited access for international observers at trials.

The government restricted religious activity, treating virtually all religious observance outside state-sanctioned structures as a crime. Courts convicted many independent Muslims of extremist activity, and the government harassed several Protestant groups. The government pressured other countries to return forcibly Uzbek refugees who were under the protection of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and increased pressure on Afghan refugees to return home. There was a widespread public perception of corruption throughout society. While the government took steps to combat trafficking in persons, it remained a problem. The use of compulsory labor, particularly in cotton harvesting, continued.