Being Anchored by the Image of Soviet Success
In the atmosphere of general chaos that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and suffering from distorted trade links and unsecured currency, the image of Belarus as one of the most stable and successful republic saw a blowing crash. Unable to get public support for painful market reforms and under strong pressure from industrial groups for continuation of the state subsidies for large and for the most part ineffective enterprises, (Savchenko, 2002) Belarus was facing an economic collapse.
Above mentioned factors and skyrocketing inflation put Belarus in a position where by 1993 it owed 112 billion rubles to Russia, was only able to export 4 percent of its production to the countries outside of the former Soviet Union (Tiurina, 1994). A country knowns an “assembly line” of the Soviet Union (Tiurina, 1994), Belarus was no longer able to import cheap energy and export overpriced “soft goods”, a scheme that worked well in the Soviet Union (Bakanova, 2003). In other words, all these aspects as well as high cost of raw materials and energy needed by its factories and plants to produce or assemble finished goods put Belarus at a great disadvantage (Tarr, 1994).
Indeed, while its huge industrial sector along with enormous subsidies and cheap energy helped Belarus to advance in the Soviet period, it eventually contributed to its demise in the post Soviet era. By 1993, approximately 125 Belarusian industrial companies were producing durable goods, primarily for military purposes. They employed 250 thousand people who assembled automated control, communication systems, TV sets, refrigerators and radios for the Soviet markets. Belarusian industry was facing Russian monopoly on raw materials, increased oil prices by as many as 30 times (compared to artificial 1991 price level) and a minimum salary of 4 dollars a month (Tiurina, 1994). Therefore, it should not be surprising that everything was perfectly lined up for a populist Alexander Lukashenka to exploit the very same issues and use them to become the first Belarusian president in 1994 (Balmaceda, 2006).
Back in 1991, Mr. Lukashenka was the only representative in the Belarusian Supreme Soviet who voted against the creation of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) because he did not see it as a valid substitution for the Soviet Union (The Economist, 1994). During the Presidential campaign in 1994 and in the midst of economic crisis, he promised to fight corruption, pledged the state support for industrial and agricultural enterprises, promised to freeze prices and end inflation. Mr. Lukashenka was also seen favorably by many because he wasn’t affiliated with the old-Soviet guard and he wasn’t seen as a nationalist (The Economist, 1994).These factors and highly effective public relations campaign further helped his presidential candidacy and ultimately led to his victory.
Related posts:
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Most Perfect Soviet’ Republic
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Situation overview
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Introduction.
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? 1990′s
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Geographical position
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Excuse my french but, This post makes my mind spin at the speed of dark.
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