The Model I, II, and III are different in type of questions they pose, perspectives, approaches and possible outcomes. However different though, together they provide a fuller picture because upon a closer look they could be logically linked together.
Model I shows that Belarus is strategically positioned to take advantage of its status as a transit intermediary between Russia and the West. Belarus has all prerequisites to be a successful country with well-organized and running economy. Despite the fact that it lacks resources and has big industrial sector and thus needs to import most of its energy and raw material needs, Belarus is not confined to Russia as sole provider of them. It has unique geographical position that allows it to trade and address its needs with multiple European partners. The European Union has significantly expanded and can offer Belarus a large network of energy suppliers and buyers of Belarusian goods.
However, the results of second and third models preclude Belarus from making a step toward closer integration with the West.
Mr. Lukashenka built his system on rigid political and economic values common in the Soviet Union. He centralized the economy and consolidated a decision making in his own hands. It does not seem that there is a person in his administration who could convince him to lessen his grip on power. He might show off his erratic behavior once in a while, however it does not diminish his ability to control and understand the situation. He understands that Belarus’ reliance on cheap Russian energy helped to propel its otherwise ineffective industry and economy. He knows that Russia subsidies his economy and boosts it with cash flows from oil and gas business. But he also realizes that his personal and state managing style might no longer satisfy Russia and its political leadership who could conceivably benefit from change in Belarusian leadership. Russia needs to promote an image of a reliable energy exporter in its dealings with Western European customers and Mr. Lukashenka showed on couple occasions his unwillingness to support it.
At the same time, a decisive move towards the West might also result in loss of power for him. Any serious dealings with Western partners would require not only economic liberalization but also political transparency and adoption of various democratic principles, something that his system and personal preferences are not prepared for.
Thus, considering results and analysis of three models, possible scenarios and outcomes, it might be concluded that Belarus would remain close to Russia. Despite obvious deficiencies in its energy policies and need for reforming largely inefficient and incompatible with contemporary systems economy, reasons of political safety and unwillingness to burn political capital seem to prevail. And while Belarus might continue obtain economic and political support from Russia in exchange of energy transit services; it seems unlikely that Belarus will be able to do it as an independent state.
Related posts:
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Model III
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Model I
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Model II
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Situation overview
- How do energy politics impact national sovereignty of Belarus? Most Perfect Soviet’ Republic
